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Abstract
Many developing economies are characterized by the dominance of a super
metropolis. The coexistence of a primate city with a low level of economic
development is not an accident, the former being symptomatic of the causes of
the latter. Taking historical Rome as the archetype of a city that centralizes
political power to extract resources from the rest of the country, we develop
two models of rent-seeking and expropriation which illustrate diﬀerent mech-
anisms that relate political competition to economic outcomes. The voice
model shows that rent-seeking by diﬀerent interest groups (localized in diﬀer-
ent specialized cities/regions) will lead to low investment and growth when the
number of these groups is low. Increased political competition in the form of
more organized groups engaged in countervailing activity leads to more secure
property rights and higher growth. The exit model allows political competi-
tion among those with political power (to tax or expropriate from citizens) over
a footloose tax base. It shows that when this power is centralized, tax rates
would be higher and growth rates lower. When political power is decentralized
across diﬀerent self-interested rulers in diverse jurisdictions, the competition
over the mobile resources leads to lower tax/expropriation rates, raising the
long-run rate of growth of the economy.
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1 Introduction
At its zenith, around second century A.D., Rome had become by far the largest city
in the world with a population probably well in excess of 800,000, representing the
largest part of the urban population of Italy. Citizens of this megalopolis enjoyed some
unprecedented advantages. Roman law had quite early on (123 B.C.) entitled each
citizen to receive a certain quantity of wheat at a Þxed price. By 58 B.C. a succession
of amendments to the law had reduced this price to zero. By 45 B.C. no less than
320,000 Romans received a free daily ration of bread that varied from 1 to 1.5 kilograms
(yielding calories that would exceed the daily needs of an average adult).1 Though, it
has been estimated that by this time between 30 to 40 percent of the residents of Rome
were either unemployed or underemployed, [t]he state distribution of bread never bore,
and would never bear, the least resemblance to assistance. Nothing indicates that the
poorest citizens were given preference;...everything points to the reverse.2 Rome used
its military and political might to suppress potential competitors to its rule and to
extract resources from its empire. The result was that the parasitic character of the
Roman metropolis was not only responsible for a weakening of the Italian economy; it
also played a central part in...the collapse of the empire.3
The parallels between the remarkable Roman concentration of urban population and
political power in a primate citya city that dominates all other urban areas in a given
countryand similar patterns observed in the developing countries of the modern world
has led Bairoch (1988) to label these modern primate cities Romes without empires.
Table 1 oﬀers some suggestive examples of the dominance of several of these cities as of
1991.4
1See Bairoch (1988, p. 81).
2Veyne (1976) cited in ibid. p.84.
3ibid. p. 105.
4The table is taken from Balchin et al. (2000).
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Table 1
Country Largest City Population in largest city
Urban population Total population
(percent) (percent)
Guinea Conakry 89 23
Mauritania Nouakchott 83 39
Costa Rica San Jose 77 36
Congo Brazzaville 68 28
Angola Luanda 61 17
Thailand Bangkok 57 13
Gabon Libreville 57 26
Liberia Monrovia 57 26
Haiti Port au Prince 56 16
Togo Lome 55 14
Such concentrations were for a long time in the making. Around 1930, when devel-
oping market economies had an average level of urbanization of 12.6 %, 16% of their
urban population lived in fourteen large cities (cities that had populations of more than
half a million). Such a high concentration of urban population in large cities of the
developed world had been attained in 1880, when its average level of urbanization stood
much higher at 23%. The number of the large cities in the developing world as well as
the size of the population in them increased radically between 1930 and 1980, by which
date they had 43% of the urban population, a number which paralleled that of the de-
veloped countries. However, the level of urbanization in the latter stood at 65% whereas
developing market economies had an urbanization level half of that.5 Furthermore, as
a recent survey puts it [s]ince primate cities are invariably national capitals, they are
centres of decision-making and opinion-forming. They are thus able to dominate their
countries both economically and politically (Balchin et al. 2000, p. 64).
Primate cities of the developing world typically started out as major outlets for
the export of products from their hinterlands and became centers of colonial or post-
colonial administration, beneÞting from a lack of eﬀective competition from provincial
centers.6 Thus, in colonial Spanish America a tiny number of ports (one in Spain and
three in America) monopolized trade and prevented the formation of a dense commer-
cial network, impeding the genesis of a system of specialization and exchange across the
5For these numbers, see Bairoch (1988).
6Clark (1996) and Balchin (2000).
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colonies. In contrast, British North America developed hundreds of ports and surround-
ing hinterland economies, letting them compete against each other.7 This contrast is
symptomatic of the structural diﬀerences that led the two regions along divergent polit-
ical and economic paths. North et al. (2000) argue that centralization of political power
that results in an authoritarian establishment of order typically leads these governments
to transgress the rights of the citizens. The lack of well-deÞned rights implies that more
resources have to be devoted by agents to protect themselves from the state reducing the
amount of resources allocated to productive activities. By reducing the threat of unilat-
eral expropriation of property, a more polycentric distribution of political power, on the
other hand, would lead to more secure property rights and a larger share of resources al-
located to productive activities. The connection between the security of property rights,
the distribution of political power and cities have long been recognized. In the Wealth
of Nations, Adam Smith emphasized the importance of the liberty and security of indi-
viduals, noting that it was because of this security in the cities that industry ßourished
and stock accumulated there before the country. Smith argued that cities in France
and England were given their freedom as a consequence of the political competition be-
tween the sovereign and feudal lords. As he put it [t]he burghers naturally hated and
feared the lords. The king hated and feared them too; but though perhaps he might
despise, he had no reason either to hate or fear the burghers. Mutual interest, therefore,
disposed them to support the king, and the king to support them against the lords.
They were the enemies of his enemies, and it was his interest to render them as secure
and independent of those enemies as he could (2000, p. 430). It was also the direct
pressure put on princes by alliances of cities such as the Hanseatic League, Greif et al.
(1994) argue, that led to more secure property rights and, therefore, to the medieval
expansion of trade. A related argument is put forward by Weingast (1995), who points
out the role played by decentralization (federalism) in the economic development and
growth of Netherlands from the late 16th through mid-17th century, England from the
late 17th or early 18th through the mid-19th century, and the United States from the
late 19th century until the late 20th century. An important reason why the industrial
revolution could make headway in England was that when regulations in the established
urban centers threatened to choke oﬀ the ßedgling industrial activity, local justices in
the north, who had their own political authority and,thus, regulatory power, competed
to attract new forms of economic activity to their jurisdictions. This pattern, which
would have been impossible in an economy where all Þscal and regulatory power had
7North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000).
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been centralized, was eventually repeated elsewhere in Europe which saw the rise of a
large number of new towns and cities that came to represent the new industrial interests
as opposed to the established centers8.
Wherever the interests represented by the cities were politically dominated by other
interests the results were debilitating. Thus, for instance, in the early modern period,
[t]he economic crisis faced by the towns gave the [Eastern European] nobility, helped
by its close links to the monarchy, the chance to break the bourgeois monopoly of foreign
and domestic trade, to prohibit cities from granting asylum to runaway serfs, to outwit
the burghers in commercial transactions and to secure price advantages for its own prod-
ucts by virtue of tariﬀ reductions. Weakened by the measures rammed through diets by
princes and noblemen, many Eastern European cities began to stagnate... This trend was
accompanied by stagnating and in some instances declining productivity. Under such
conditions peasant farming made little progress or even fell behind. (Rýosener,1994,
pp. 111-113). The contrast between the European and Asian historical experiences
is also very instructive. Whereas medieval European cities made one free,9, as Elvin
(1978) puts it Chinese air made nobody free. This was because unlike the cities in
Europe [t]he [Chinese] city had nothing like a city charter, and no independent ad-
ministration;... no laws and privileges that applied especially to its inhabitants; and no
indigenous social groups that would have thought of demanding city dwellers rights
from the central government. In short, Chinese cities had no separate legal or political
status; they were not corporate entities and had none of the organizational features that
set European cities apart...[The] Chinese city did not make people free in speciÞc political
and legal senses... (Mote pp. 761-62). Moreover, [t]he emergence of capitalism neces-
sarily also depended on the expansion of the judiciary system to deÞne the conditions
under which private enterprise can grow; it has also required that economic interests be
given relatively free rein to develop and that government allow rational implementation
of business operations free of excessive interference. None of these conditions was being
met in the late Ming and early Qing; there is no visible trend in that direction (ibid., p.
769). It was in the second half of the nineteenth century that a number of port cities of
the Asian agrarian empires were able to break free of the centralized authorities. Inter-
national agreements imposed upon these authorities by the colonial powers established
judicial systems that dramatically improved security of property rights and led to an
8See Bairoch (1988). De Vries (1984) shows that during early industrialization in Europe the slope
of the rank-size distributions became ßatter, indicating a movement towards polycentrism.
9The medieval german expression stadtluft macht frei (city air makes one free) indicated that serfs
who made it to the city were freed from their obligations to their lords.
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unprecedented economic expansion.10 In the same vein, the recent economic renaissance
of a number of Chinese cities followed the establishment of a decentralized Þscal system.
Since the late 1970s the central Chinese government has given many cities as well as
semi-rural settlements ...varying degrees of autonomy in handling foreign investment,
collecting taxes and dispensing revenue...The number of administrative areas, deÞned as
cities, consequently increased from 289 in 1982 to 570 in 1993 (Balchian et al., 2000,
p. 68). Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1996) argue that it is this decentralization that
ensured the success of the Chinese reforms of 1979-1993. By establishing alternative
centers of power, argue Montinola et al., decentralization generated forces that success-
fully resisted later attempts by the central government to compromise the reforms and
led to the continuation of Chinas spectacular growth.
The connection between urban concentration and the level of economic development
has been the subject of a large literature starting with the seminal paper of Williamson
(1965) which put forward the hypothesis that one should expect a non-monotonic relation
between the two. At early stages of development, Williamson supposed high urban
concentration to be helpful by conserving on infrastructure and by enhancing information
spillovers at a point when the economy suﬀers from a severe scarcity of infrastructure
and information. With the development of the economy, it becomes possible to spread
the infrastructure and information over to the hinterland, while rising costs in congested
urban areas push producers and consumers out of these erstwhile centers. This pattern
of income growth resulting initially in higher and later in lower urban concentration is
supported by a number of empirical studies (Alonso, 1980; Wheaton and Shishido, 1981;
Junius, 1999; Davis and Henderson, 2003).11 A more recent strand of literature focuses
on political factors to explain high urban concentration (Henderson, 1988; Ades and
Glaeser, 1995; Henderson and Becker, 2000). Here the mechanism emphasized is that of
a national government favoring a capital or central city in terms of investment, granting
of loans, licences, etc. at the expense of the hinterland. This, it is argued, for instance
allows the bureaucrats in the center to compete more eﬀectively in the extraction of rents
10See Basu (1985), Broeze (1989), and Keyder et al. (1993).
11The most common measure of urban concentration used in the literature is urban primacytypically
the share of the largest urban area in the total urban population of the country (see Ades and Glaeser,
1995, Henderson, 2003). There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) Wheaton and Shishido (1981) and
Henderson (1988) use the Hirschman-HerÞndahl index of concentration, and (2) Rosen and Resnick
(1981) employ the Pareto parameter measuring how quickly the city size declines as one moves downward
in the distribution. However, because of data limitations, both measures cover a small number of
countries for a single year.
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against low-ranking rivals in the provinces. Finally, there is an emergent literature, as
exempliÞed by Henderson (2003), that is directly relevant to our paper in that it grapples
the link between urban concentration and economic growth.12 Henderson Þnds evidence
that there is a level of urban concentration that maximizes productivity growth and that
this level depends on the development and the size of the economy.
Our paper diﬀers from the existing literature in the area in that, unlike others (ex-
cept Henderson, 2003), it focuses on the political economy mechanisms that causally
link urban concentration to growth. The argument here is that urban concentration, by
eﬀectively centralizing political and economic power at the expense of potential com-
petitors that could have risen elsewhere, has deleterious eﬀects on the rate of growth of
the third world economies. Several political economy mechanisms may account for the
suggested negative eﬀects of centralization. The paper (unlike Henderson, 2003) formal-
izes two of these which could be called the voice and exit mechanisms. The Þrst one
supposes that with division of labor and specialization diﬀerent urban centers become
nodes of diﬀerent and potentially competing interests. To the extent that the political
institutions allow for and respond to active rent-seeking by these interests, agents will
not restrict themselves to purely economic activities, but engage in rent-seeking and try
to redistribute income to themselves through political channels. The voice model (a
version of the celebrated Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobbying setup) that formalizes
such activity shows that as long as political competition remains limited, those orga-
nized groups that expend resources in rent-seeking succeed in redistributing income to
themselves. However, a rise in the number of interests that engage in such political
competition, reduces and eventually eliminates such redistribution. Insofar as redistri-
bution leads to deadweight losses, its elimination would have beneÞcial consequences for
economic development. The second mechanism is formalized in an exit model which
starts with the argument that competition among rulers of political centers with some
ability to conduct independent economic policy (such as cities that are administrative
centers of regions within a country) might promote economic growth.13 An environment
that could give rise to such an outcome is one where footloose agents Þnd it possible to
move to those jurisdictions/cities where rulers oﬀer policies that are more conducive to
economic welfare of these agents. The exit model indeed shows that centralization of
12Gallup et al. (1999) imply that urbanization may promote growth. Henderson (2003) Þnds no
evidence for this hypothesis.
13Karayalcin (2003) uses this setup in comparing the historical records of the agrarian empires of the
East with that of the European states system.
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power leads to higher expropriation rates14 and lower levels of public services, whereas
political competition for mobile resources improves outcomes signiÞcantly, leading to
higher long-run growth rates.
The role of political competition in promoting the adoption of more eﬃcient policies
in general has been noted in diﬀerent contexts. Grossman and Helpman (1994) and
Mitra (1999), for instance, show that the higher is the number of lobbies involved the
smaller is the tariﬀ subsidies awarded.15 Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) point out
that concentration of political power in the hands of an elite implies that the majority
of the population risks being held up by the elite after they undertake investments. This
lack of secure property rights would then discourage investment and economic growth.
Weingast (1995) argues that the crucial factor that generated economic expansion in both
cases was political competition among jurisdictions (which he labels market-preserving
federalism) for the mobile capital and labor because this competition limited the ability
of the state to conÞscate wealth.16 Epple and Romer (1991) present a static closed-
economy model where exit, that is the mobility of factors (á la Tiebout, 1956) subject
to taxation, limits the extent of redistribution. Optimal taxation when the tax base is
mobile internationally has been studied extensively in the literature (see Persson and
Tabellini (1995) for a survey.) Recent common property models of growth (see, for
example, Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996, Lane and Tornell, 1996) focus on the negative
eﬀects of conßict among social groups on growth as they attempt to expropriate resources
from each other. In Grossman and Kim (1996) agents adopt a voice strategy, namely
arming themselves to the teeth against potential predators/expropriators.17 Another
historically important alternative strategy is insurrection or revolt that, if successful,
results in the expropriation of the rulers by their subjects (see Grossman, 1991). Thus,
14For a similar argument see Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) who point out that concentration
of political power in the hands of an elite implies that the majority of the population risks being held up
by the elite after they undertake investments. This lack of secure property rights would then discourage
investment and economic growth.
15See also Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 7).
16Weingast (1995) Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1996) also point out the fundamental role played
by federalism in the remarkable growth performance of China over the past two decades. North, Sum-
merhill, and Weingast (2000) and Nugent and Robinson (2001) emphasize the importance of political
competition for the growth performance of a number of Latin American countries.
17In their empirical investigation of the importance of institutions, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003)
Þnd that institutions which protect citizens against expropriation have a Þrst order eﬀect on long-run
economic growth.
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) argue cogently that the extension of the franchise in
the West was a response to the threat of revolution. Democracy was necessary because
the only safeguard for sustained redistribution desired by the masses was possession of
political power. This link between political power and the redistribution of wealth it
aﬀords those who happen to command such power has been used in a number of diﬀerent
contexts. Acemoglu and Robinson (2002a) exploit this link to argue that political elites
may block technological and institutional developments for fear that it would lead to
loss of political power, which would then translate into an economic loss. Alesina and
Rodrik (1994), among others, point out that in majoritarian democracies, which give
the median voter the decisive political power, this power could be used to redistribute
wealth. To the extent that such redistribution has to be carried out by distortionary
taxation, this would lower the rate of growth of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the models of
voice and exit as versions of political competition. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Voice: Rent-seeking/Lobbying
The voice model presented here captures in a simple way the mechanism whereby limited
political competition among self-interested parties would lead to distortions and dead-
weight losses. Increased political competition, on the other hand, would lead to more
secure property rights (in the sense of reduced expropriation/taxation from unorganized
groups) and more investment. To the extent that one identiÞes diﬀerent interests as
being locally diﬀerentiatedas would be the case, for instance, in an economy where
division of labor and specialization has advancedthis would imply that those countries
that are more polycentric would have higher growth rates.
Consider now an economy populated by two types of agents: a ruler (government)
and a large number of citizens whose mass is normalized to one. All agents live for
two periods. There are N groups of citizens in the economy, each representing a special
interest localized in diﬀerent cities/regions. Each group has mass λi with λi = 1. Some
of the groups are organized into interest groups, others remain unorganized. Without
loss of generality let Θ = {1, .., n} and Λ = {n + 1, .., N} be the sets of organized and
unorganized groups. Each citizen in group i maximizes lifetime utility Ui given by
Ui = u(c1i) + βu(c2i), (1)
subject to
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c1i = (1− τ i)ei − si, c2i = Rsi (2)
where cki is consumption in period-k (k²{1, 2})of an agent in group i, R is the gross
rate of return, e interest and s denote endowment income and savings. The only policy
instruments available to the ruler are proportional tax/subsidy rates, the vector of which
is denoted by τ = (τ 1, ..., τN) where τ i > 0 (τ i < 0) denotes a tax (subsidy) rate.
Solution of a citizens problem given in (1) and (2) yields the indirect utility
Vi = V (τ i), V
0(.) < 0. (3)
Suppose, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), that the rulers utility function UR(τ )
takes the form
UR(τ) =
X
j²Θ
Cj(τ ) + aΩ(τ ) (4)
where Cj(τ) is the contribution schedule of interest group j, Ω =
PN
i=1 λiVi is aggregate
social welfare, and a is the weight the ruler attaches to social welfare Ω. If a = 0, the
ruler cares only about the contributions he receives, while if a → ∞ he behaves as a
utilitarian social planner.
Suppose that the tax-cum-subsidy policy is purely redistributionary
X
λiτ iei − T = 0 (5)
where T is the deadweight loss from taxation.
Rent seeking by organized lobbies takes the following form: all groups organized into
lobbies oﬀer truthful contribution schedules
Cj(τ ) = max[0,λj(Vj(τ)− ωj)] (6)
(where the scalars ωi are to be determined in equilibrium) that reveal how much they
are willing to pay for the implementation of the policy vector τ . The ruler chooses τ
after observing the oﬀered contributions.
Focusing, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), on equilibria where organized groups
make positive contributions, (4) and (5) yield
maxUR(τ ) =
X
j²Θ
λj(Vj(τ )− ωj) + aΩ(τ)⇒ max
X
j²Θ
λjVj(τ) + aΩ(τ). (7)
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Thus,
τ = argmax
τ
X
j²Θ
λjVj(τ ) + a
X
i²Θ∪Λ
λiVi(τ)
 , (8)
that is the policy vector chosen by the ruler is the one that maximizes a weighted social
welfare function where the welfare of organized groups receives the weight 1+a, whereas
that of the unorganized groups receives a weight of only a. In other words, rent-seekers
(groups that engage in lobbying here) obtain favorable treatment from the ruler in return
for the resources transferred to him. Note also that (6) is a special form of the more
general political support function of Hillman (1989) and provides micro foundations for
this function.
To put the results into sharp focus, specialize now the period utility functions u(
cki) to u( cki) = ln cki, and let the deadweight loss be proportional to total (and given
λi = 1, average) income e =
P
i²Θ∪Λ λiei, so that
T =
 σe > 0 if ∃i such that τ i > 0,0 if ∀i τ i = 0. (9)
(7) then yields the following expressions for the tax/subsidy rates for organized and
unorganized groups
τ j = 1− e
ej
(1 + a)(1− σ)
(λo + a)
, j²Θ (10)
τ i = 1− e
ei
a(1− σ)
(λo + a)
, i²Λ (11)
where λo²[0, 1] denotes the mass of individuals organized in interest groups. These
equations yield a number of results, the most important of which for our purposes are
summarized by the following.
Proposition 1 Let, for simplicity, all individuals have the same endowment income so
that ei = e for all i²Θ ∪ Λ. Then organized groups receive a subsidy and unorganized
groups are taxed as long as the mass of individuals belonging to rent-seeking groups is
less than a critical level λo = 1−σ(1+a). Once the critical level is reached redistribution
ends.
Proof. This follows immediately from (8)-(11).
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The proposition reßects the argument that interest groups typically engage in rent-
seeking activities, attempting to redistribute income from the rest of the population to
themselves. Such activity succeeds as long as it does not meet with eﬀective opposition
from groups that are adversely eﬀected.
Proposition 2 Redistribution depresses aggregate investment and, thus, growth until
political competition among interest groups reaches a critical level (expressed by the crit-
ical mass of organized groups in Proposition 1). Beyond that critical level investment
and growth bounces to a higher level.
Proof. First note that (1) and (2) yield si = [β/(1 + β)](1 − τ i)ei. Thus, total
savings s is given by s = [β/(1 + β)]
P
i²Θ∪Λ(1− τ i)λiei. Substituting the rulers budget
constraint yields s = [β/(1 + β)](e − T ). Once political competition among groups (as
measured by the mass λo of citizens engaged in organized rent-seeking activity) reaches
the critical level λo the ruler stops redistributing income through taxes and subsidies,
deadweight losses vanish and savings, investment, and, thus, growth rises to a higher
level.
Thus, we have established that once it attains a certain critical level, increased
political competition among interest groups leads to reduced taxation (expropriation),
improving the security of property, and, thus leading to more investment and higher
levels of growth.
3 Exit: Long-run growth under centralized and de-
centralized systems
I now turn to an analysis of long-run growth under centralized and decentralized systems.
To do so I use a simple dynamic setup to illustrate the main points. An economy in
this setup consists of two types of agents, rulers and citizens. Citizens produce a good
that can be used for consumption and investment. Rulers appropriate a portion of the
good produced and in return may choose to supply public services that enhance the
productivity of the citizens. Rulers are identiÞed with diﬀerent cities/regions which I
will label jurisdictions. I start by discussing the role and nature of these public services.
3.1 Productive Public Services
Each citizen i in jurisdiction j has access to a production technology summarized by
11
yji = αk
j
i f(G
j/Y j), f(0) = 0, f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0, (12)
where yji is the quantity of the composite good produced by the citizen i, α is a positive
constant, kji is the stock of capital
18 that the citizen has in his possession, f is a func-
tion that depends on the total output of the jurisdiction Y j =
R
yji di, and G
j ≥ 0 denotes
the amount of public good provided by the ruler of jurisdiction j. The formulation of the
function f(·) reßects three considerations: (i) the higher is the level of public services
provided, the more productive is each producer; (ii) the provision of public services is
essential for social order and for production so that if the ruler fails to provide such
services no production can take place (f(0) = 0); and (iii) typically the provision of
public services such as security, adjudication, irrigation works, roads, and waterways is
subject to congestion, i.e. the public service is rival but not excludable.19 For a given
amount of public services Gj, the quantity of the service available for each user falls as
more users take advantage of the services provided. Thus, in (1) we have an increase in
Y j for given Gj reducing the level of public services available to each producer as well
as leading to a decline in the output yji of each producer.
20 Note for future reference
that had there, unrealistically, been no congestion in the provision of public services, the
resulting growth rate would display scale eﬀects.
Equation (12) also implies that the output of an individual producer is subject to
constant returns to the private capital, provided that the ruler maintains a constant
level of public services to total output, that is a constant level of congestion.
I now turn to the description of the problem faced by the citizens.
18I interpret the capital stock k as a composite having physical and human capital components.
It is straightforward to show that under certain conditions a model with both types capital can be
formulated as in (1) (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, pp. 144-146). I also interpret human capital
as a comprehensive stock of all knowledge and human capital accumulation as including research,
development, and invention. In this I follow Lucas (2002) who questions the usefulness and empirical
validity of the models that interpret human capital as schooling and, thus, need to add a second
state variable called blueprints to account for all sources of productivity growth.
19Note that G is a ßow, so that the right interpretation say, for roads, would be total mileage per
year, etc.
20For a thorough analysis of this and other formulations as well as their implications, see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2000).
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3.2 The citizens
Citizens are inÞnitely-lived dynastic families. Each family i residing in jurisdiction j
chooses its consumption cji to maximize its lifetime welfare U
j
i given by
Ui =
Z ∞
0
u(cji,t)e
−ρtdt, u(ci,t) =
(cji,t)
1−θ − 1
1− θ (13)
subject to the budget constraint21
cji + úk
j
i = (1− τ j)yji (14)
where τ j is the constant rate at which the ruler expropriates income. Henceforth, for
simplicity I shall call τ j the tax rate with the understanding that this need not coincide
with the legal tax rate (legitimized by whatever political mechanism that may exist).
This is important because extra-legal expropriation historically played an important role
in the transfer of income from the ruled to the ruler.22
A jurisdiction j starts life with a continuum of citizens whose mass is N j. The
citizens may choose to change the location of their residence, which coincides with the
location of their productive activities. Changing a location is taken to imply migration
from one jurisdiction to another. Citizens migrate, taking their capital with them, if
doing so improves their welfare. Citizens who migrate incur a one-time migration cost
ξ ≥ 0.
3.3 The rulers
Each jurisdiction is ruled by one inÞnitely-lived ruler. Rulers derive utility from con-
sumption. They also derive an additional beneÞt from ruling a jurisdiction with a
minimum number, N¯ > 0, of inhabitants. We suppose that this is the minimum number
required, inter alia, to sustain, for instance, the jurisdiction and its ruler as independent
entities. Formally,
U jr =
Z ∞
0
u(cjr,t)e
−ρtdt+ Ω(N j), u(cr,t) =
(cjr,t)
1−θ − 1
1− θ ,
21In what follows I drop the time subscripts except where there is risk of confusion.
22Historically, of course, everywhere more than one agent taxed the producer and not every tax
demanded by every collector was legal. I simplify by assuming that there exists one ruler per jurisdic-
tion. However, allowing for other expropriators will not change the conclusions regarding the contrast
between centralized and decentralized systems and adds nothing to understanding the basic mechanisms
involved in that contrast.
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Ω(N j) =
 ∆ > 0 if N j ≥ N¯ > 00 if N j < N¯ , (15)
where the subscript r indicates a ruler and the function Ω(N j) captures the additional
beneÞts a ruler enjoys when the jurisdiction has at least N¯ citizens.23
From citizens residing and producing in jurisdiction j its ruler collects tax revenues
τ jY j of which he uses a fraction (1− µj) to Þnance the provision of public goods; thus,
Gj = (1−µj)τ jY j. The rest is employed for the rulers consumption; thus cj = µjτ jY j.
I now turn to the description of equilibrium Þrst in a centralized economy and sec-
ondly in a decentralized system of multiple jurisdictions forming an economy .
3.4 The centralized economy
A centralized economy for our purposes is an economy from which its inhabitants Þnd
it impossible to emigrate. Formally, a centralized economy is an economy where the
migration cost ξ →∞. Thus, the ruler of such a centralized economy Þnds himself with
a subject population on which taxes can be imposed without fear of losing at least some
of them to a rival ruler. The problem that confronts such a ruler is to determine (1) the
level of the proportional tax to be imposed upon his citizens and (2) the fraction of the
tax revenue that can be used to Þnance the rulers consumption. An increase in the tax
rate has two contradictory consequences. On the one hand, it reduces the rate of return
on investment and, thus, lowers the rate of capital accumulation by his citizens. This
depresses future output and future revenues that can be appropriated by the ruler. On
the other hand, given the existing capital stock, a higher tax rate yields, ceteris paribus,
more tax revenue, enabling the ruler to supply a higher quantity of the public good.
This, in turn, increases both the output and the rate of return on investment.
Formally, to solve the problem confronting the ruler of the centralized economy, we
start by describing the behavior of the citizens facing given τ and µ (thus, a given
quantity of the public good relative to total output).24 Citizens maximize their utility
given in (13) subject to (12) and (14), facing an after tax rate of return on capital equal
to (1 − τ)αf(G/Y ). It is straightforward to show that given constant τ and µ, the
23The only role this additional beneÞt plays in the analysis that follows is to ensure that a ruler that
chooses the optimal tax and appropriation rates is never indiﬀerent between that choice and that of
adopting policies that lead to the loss of all citizens.
24In this section I drop the economy superscripts j because we are concerned with a single centralized
economy.
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choices of the citizens yield growth rates for consumption, capital, and output all equal
to the same constant g given by
g = (1/θ) {(1− τ )αf [(1− µ)τ ]− ρ} . (16)
Given our restrictions on the function f(·), this growth rate initially rises with the
tax rate τ at low values and falls with it as τ keeps rising, reßecting the trade-oﬀs
mentioned above. The value of τ that maximizes the growth rate g is implicitly given
by (1−τ )(1−µ)f 0[(1−µ)τ ] = f [(1−µ)τ ]. Since a higher rate of consumption µ reduces
the amount of public good supplied by the ruler, it lowers the growth rate.
The welfare of an individual citizen, given this constant growth rate, (12), (13), and
(14) can be expressed as
Ui = (1− θ)−1
"
k1−θi,0
ρ− g(1− θ) −
1
ρ
#
,
dUi
dg
> 0. (17)
Thus, the welfare of an individual citizen depends positively on the growth rate g.25
Turning now to the problem faced by the ruler, we Þrst observe that since his con-
sumption is given by c = µτY it also grows at the common constant rate g given
time-invariant choices for τ and µ. His lifetime welfare is hence given by
Ur = (1− θ)−1
"
c1−θr,0
ρ− g(1− θ) −
1
ρ
#
+ Ω(N), cr,0 = µτaK0f [(1− µ)τ ] (18)
where K0 =
R
ki,0di is the aggregate initial capital stock. The ruler uses the instruments
at his disposal, τ and µ to maximize his lifetime welfare. The Þrst-order conditions for
his maximization problem can be expressed (with π ∈ {τ , µ}) as
∂Ur/∂π = Λ {[ρ− g(1− θ)] (∂cr,0/∂π) + cr,0 (∂g/∂π)} = 0, Λ ≡ c−θr,0 [ρ− g(1− θ)]−2
(19)
where
∂cr,0/∂τ = (µ/f)Y0 [f(·) + (1− µ)τf 0(·)] > 0, ∂g/∂τ = (α/θ) [(1− µ)(1− τ)f 0(·)− f(·)]
∂cr,0/∂µ = (ατK0) [f(·)− µτf 0(·)] , ∂g/∂µ = − (α/θ) (1− τ)τf 0(·) < 0.
25In (6) the sign of the partial derivative follows from ρ − g(1 − θ) > 0 which is required for the
transversality condition to hold.
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From (19) a number of conclusions immediately follow. First, note that since ∂Ur/∂τ = 0
for optimality and since ∂cr,0/∂τ > 0, the choice of τ by the ruler here implies that
∂g/∂τ < 0. That is, the optimal tax rate for the ruler of the centralized economy is not
the one that maximizes the growth rate. One consequence of this is that the growth
rate that results from the rulers choice is not the one that maximizes the welfare of
his citizens. To see this recall from (17) above that a citizens lifetime welfare depends
positively on the growth rate. Thus, the growth rate that would be optimal for this
citizen is the maximum one that the economy can attain.26 The growth rate chosen by
the ruler is, however, less than this maximum. Further, given the relationship between
the growth and tax rates discussed above, it is easy to see that the tax rate is higher than
the one that would be chosen by a benevolent ruler that seeks to maximize the welfare of
the citizens. Second, observe that since ∂Ur/∂µ = 0 for optimality and since ∂g/∂µ < 0,
the choice of µ by the ruler implies that ∂cr,0/∂µ > 0. Now with the restrictions imposed
on f(·), cr,0 = 0 when µ = 0 and cr,0 = 0 when µ → 1, we have cr,0 increasing at low
levels of µ and decreasing at higher values of µ. These considerations imply that the
ruler chooses a rate of consumption µ that is less than the rate that would maximize his
initial consumption cr,0. Clearly, this is the case because of intertemporal considerations.
Though a higher µ makes it possible to enjoy higher current consumption, it lowers the
growth rate and thus the future consumption of the ruler. Finally (8) implies the familiar
condition for eﬃciency
dY
dG
=
f 0(·)
f(·) + τ (1− µ)f 0(·) = 1. (20)
Thus, the ruler chooses the level of G such that the marginal beneÞt, dY/dG, of public
services provided equals its marginal cost in terms of output foregone (which is one unit).
Note that the equation in (20) implicitly yields a unique value for τ (1− µ) = Y/G that
only depends on the properties of the function f(·) and nothing else. One consequence
of this is that changes in the underlying structure of the economy that lead to alterations
in the optimum level of the tax rate τ would necessarily be accompanied by changes in
µ of the same sign.
To see how the tax and consumption rates are aﬀected by this structure start by
focusing on the parameter a that measures the productivity of capital (see (12)) given
public services. As the calibration-simulation example summarized in Table 2 shows
26This would not in general be the case. It is true here because of the functional forms used. Allowing
for more general cases neither aﬀects the main conclusions of the paper nor does it add any signiÞcant
new insights about the mechanisms formalized.
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rulers in more productive economies tax less and retain a lower fraction µ of tax re-
ceipts for their private consumption.27 Intuitively, in a more productive economy where
investment has a higher rate of return, the ruler is better oﬀ encouraging private in-
vestment by expropriating less in exchange for higher future consumption. The ruler
also keeps a lower fraction of the tax proceeds for his consumption because the public
services he provides are more productive as well. Note that given the unique level for
τ(1− µ) = Y/G the lower tax rate raises the growth rate of the economy.
Table 2
a 0.1 0.5 1 2 3
τ 0.85 0.43 0.38 0.35 0.34
µ 0.61 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.03
One question the historical literature raises is the eﬀect of changes in the rate at which
the ruling classeshere consolidated into one rulerdiscount their future. It has been
argued, for instance, that intensiÞed dynastic struggles in certain periods made rulers
short-sighted. On the other hand, high-ranking oﬃcials found their tenures frequently
cut short by rulers fearful of the rise of rival power-holders. This tended to make these
oﬃcials in turn less concerned with a future they may not live to enjoy. This issue of a
higher average rate of time preference for the rulers can be studied here by decoupling the
rulers rate of time preference from that of the ruled. The results of this straightforward
exercise are summarized in a simulation example in Table 3 which shows that as expected
a higher rate of time preference ν for the ruler tends to make him tax more and retain a
higher proportion µ of the tax receipts for his own consumption. This lowers the growth
rate of the economy and the welfare of his subjects.
Table 3
ν 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
τ 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.43
µ 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.23
A similar issue also arises in the historical literature regarding the citizens. Rulers
in many a centralized economy tended also to be less careful about the life and limb of
their citizens. This would make these citizens discount the future, which may at any
time be cut short, at a higher rate ρ. The eﬀect of such higher levels of ρ on the choices
of the ruler is summarized in the numerical example in Table 4 which shows that both µ
and the tax rate τ is higher for those rulers whose citizens discount the future at higher
levels. However, the rise in both µ and τ is less signiÞcant as compared to the previous
27The baseline values of the parameters in the following examples are K0 = 2, ρ = 0.03, θ = 0.99,
δ = 0.02, a = 1, f(·) = [(1− µ)τ ]β with β = 0.5.
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case.
Table 4
ρ 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
τ 0.3794 0.3796 0.3798 0.3799
µ 0.1215 0.1219 0.1223 0.1227
One can also show that a decrease in the average intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution σ ≡ 1/θ raises the rate at which the ruler expropriates the ruled. Intuitively, as
the preference for growth becomes less pronounced, the desire to increase current at the
expense of future consumption leads to higher levels of µ and τ as the example in Table
5 suggests.
Table 5
θ 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.1 1.2
τ 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.48
µ 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.24 0.30
Finally, simulation results reported in Table 6 illustrate the point that in economies
where public services are more eﬃcient (as measured by the elasticity parameter β ≡
d ln f(·)/d ln(G/Y )) the rulers choose to provide more of them. The Þnancing of such
services then requires a higher tax rate as well as a lower rate of retention of tax proceeds
for the rulers consumption.
Table 6
β 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/2
τ 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.38
µ 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.12
I now turn to the discussion of equilibrium in the case of a decentralized economy.
3.5 The decentralized economy
Consider now an environment where households and rulers Þnd themselves distributed
over a number of jurisdictions j (j ∈ {1, 2, ..,M}). Initially, each jurisdiction hasN j ≥ N¯
inhabitants and a ruler. Suppose that the cost of migration is low enough to allow
movement of households across the jurisdictions; for simplicity assume that this cost
ξ = 0.
Citizens that can move around within this decentralized economy will choose to
reside in that jurisdiction that oﬀers them the highest level of lifetime welfare. Rulers
will, therefore, have to compete to attract tax-paying citizens to ensure the continuing
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existence of a tax base and the viability of their jurisdictions and rule. What will be the
equilibrium outcome of the interaction of the M rulers and their citizens?
Given our bare-bones setup, the answer is straightforward and captures the essence of
the centralized vs. decentralized economy argument. To see what is involved, note Þrst
that each ruler js strategy space Sj is given by Sj = [0, 1]× [0, 1] with a typical strategy
sj = (τ j, µj). Given the payoﬀ functions U
j
r in (4) and M rulers, the game ΓM played
by these rulers is formally ΓM = [M, {Sj}, {U jr}]. The strategy proÞle s = (s1, .., sM)
constitutes the Nash equilibrium of the game ΓM if for every j = 1, ...,M , U jr (sj , s−j) ≥
U jr (s
0
j, s−j) for all s
0
j ∈ Sj. It is straightforward to see that the Nash equilibrium of the
game ΓM is that each ruler will choose sj = (τm, µm) which ensures the maximum growth
rate. To see why, recall that the lifetime welfare of a household is maximized when the
growth rate is at its maximum (see (6)). If other rulers do not adopt the combination
sj, the ruler that does will be able to attract the subjects of others to his jurisdiction,
thereby receiving a payoﬀ higher than he would otherwise get. If other rulers adopt sj,
a ruler that does not loses all his residents and earns a payoﬀ that is less than what he
would earn had he adopted sj. Note also that the growth rate maximizing tax rate is
implicitly given by (1− τm)f 0(τm) = f(τm) and that competition among rulers results
in µm = 0.
4 Concluding Remarks
Starting from the observation that many developing economies are characterized by the
dominance of a super metropolis, we have argued that the coexistence of a primate
city with a low level of economic development is not an accident, the former being
symptomatic of the causes of the latter. Taking historical Rome as the archetype of a
city that centralizes political power to extract resources from the rest of the country,
we developed two models of rent-seeking and expropriation which illustrate diﬀerent
mechanisms that relate political competition to economic outcomes. The voice model
showed that rent-seeking by diﬀerent interest groups (localized in diﬀerent specialized
cities/regions) would lead to low investment and growth when the number of these
groups is low. Increased political competition in the form of more organized groups
engaged in countervailing activity is then shown to lead to more secure property rights
and higher growth. The exit model allowed political competition among those with
political power (to tax or expropriate from citizens) over a footloose tax base. It showed
that when this power is centralized, tax rates would be higher and growth rates lower.
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When political power is decentralized across diﬀerent self-interested rulers in diverse
jurisdictions, the competition over the mobile resources leads to lower tax/expropriation
rates, raising the long-run rate of growth of the economy.
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